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 In this paper we examine the co-management of Indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage 
as simultaneously a driver and a product of the culturalization of Indigenous peoples. 
Culturalization refers to a common practice and strategy of emphasizing cultural identity and 
cultural difference over legal and political status, which essentializes Indigenous peoples and 
reduces Indigenous rights to minority rights (Schulte-Tenckhoff 2012). Arising from the 
intersecting discourses/practices of ‘culture,’ ‘heritage,’ and ‘management’ (as we discuss in 
the following sections), co-management has been characterized as a defensibly imperfect, 
‘tweakable’ system that provides important dividends to both Indigenous and state parties, 
while additionally building a more productive and respectful relationship between the two (see, 
among others, Colfer 2005; Lu et al. 2012). The staunchest proponents go further, asserting 
that co-management is, or can be, a stepping stone to Indigenous self-determination (Natcher 
2001; Kakekaspan et al. 2013; Broderstad, 2011; Abele and Prince 2006).  
 First, we establish that prevailing, ‘authorised’ cultural heritage discourse cannot 
escape its founding in powerful concepts that are ontologically, epistemologically, and 
axiologically incompatible with – and in fact hostile to – Indigenous peoples’ social and 
political thought. Accordingly, the protection mechanisms that arise from this discourse are not 
only theoretically and practically ineffective in Indigenous contexts, they are opposed to the 
effective preservation and promotion of Indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage. We argue that 
cultural heritage can only thrive by being actively engaged with in situ: on Indigenous lands, 
through Indigenous institutions. We then demonstrate that co-management specifically, 
because its roots lie equally in neoliberalism and settler colonialism, has proven most adept at 
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subverting Indigenous peoples’ inherent rights and reinforcing state systems and jurisdictions. 
We assert that co-management is part of a globally-diffused approach, enshrined in the World 
Heritage Convention, that offers mere participation in lieu of actual control, while culturalizing 
and instrumentalising Indigenous polities and rights. These arguments converge in our core 
thesis: that cultural heritage co-management cannot be ‘tweaked’ to provide better outcomes 
for Indigenous peoples, nor can it provide a stepping stone to their self-determination. This is 
not to claim that there are never any benefits to co-management agreements in practice; indeed, 
a central premise in our argument is that a perceived or stated lack of alternatives (attributable, 
in turn, to either a dearth of practical imagination or a lack of political will, or both) often 
presents co-management as a relatively better – or better-than-nothing – scheme (Goetze 2005; 
King 2007; Spielmann and Unger 2000). Relatedly, there are analyses that present co-
management arrangements as extending along something like a spectrum, from greater to lesser 
Indigenous ‘control;’ these are neither analytically nor theoretically incorrect or necessarily 
misguided but represent a different approach and purpose to our own (Reo et al.,2017; Maclean 
et al. 2012; Broderstad 2011; Mulrennan and Scott 2005).1 Nor is our intention to dismiss the 
strategic uptake and skilful deployment of co-management discourse and practice by 
Indigenous communities worldwide (most effectively, to date, in Oceania and North America) 
(see, among others, Caruso 2011; Diver 2016; Reo et al. 2017; Salée and Lévesque 2010).  
Instead, what we are arguing is that co-management is not merely a temporary (or 
evolving) administrative arrangement but an ossified international rights regime, governed at 
the state level, that – whatever else it might accomplish – actively displaces Indigenous rights 
and Indigenous governance. In doing so, these systems and instruments violate the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) which, in establishing to 
the norm of Indigenous self-determination, forms the proper basis of Indigenous peoples’ 
governance of their own cultural heritage. In drawing these observations together, we outline 
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the key consonances between co-management and late colonial treatymaking in settler states. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the solution is not to improve co-management but to remove it 
as a barrier to Indigenous peoples’ governance over their own cultural heritage. 
Operationalizing our argument, we first consider the challenges of cultural heritage protection 
in Sápmi; specifically, the co-management arrangement at Laponia, in Northern Sweden, and 
the unprotected sacred Sámi area of Suttesája in Northern Finland. We then discuss a more 
promising framework for Indigenous governance of cultural heritage: the Quechua ‘Biocultural 
Heritage Territory’ of the Parque de la Papa, in Peru. Finally, we apply the lessons of the Parque 
to Suttesája, showing how this lateral learning opens up governance-based avenues to 
safeguarding Indigenous sacred areas. In fleshing out our theoretical discussion, these specific 
cases were chosen because they illuminate the three core issues we examine: the ongoing threat 
to Indigenous cultural heritage and sacred areas (seen at Suttesája); the problem of the co-
management regime in attempting to address this threat (in Lapponia); and one possible 
exemplar of Indigenous governance of their cultural heritage (at the Parque de la Papa), which 
demonstrates both the existence and viability of alternative ‘best practices.’  
 
A genealogy of cultural heritage co-management 
 
‘Cultural heritage co-management’ sits at the nexus of three discourses and practices: cultural 
rights, heritage protection, and conservation management. All three are simultaneously 
anticipatory and backward-looking, since they are concerned with the future preservation of 
some inherently fragile, historic good. And all three are, despite being grounded in law and 
policy, profoundly depoliticising. Where these discourses and practices overlap and combine, 
ideologies, processes, and systems emerge that have particular consequences for Indigenous 
peoples. We begin our discussion by considering the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘heritage,’ and 
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the evolution and diffusion of co-management as the dominant policy paradigm in the 




 In international law, the prevailing conception of culture is associated with material 
patrimony, either of certain groups or of humankind generally; or is focused through the lens 
of creativity, as an artistic or scientific creation, while also emphasising the sites of their 
exhibition (museums, galleries, libraries, theatres, and concert halls) (Xanthaki 2007). Notions 
of culture as capital, accumulated property, and material objects are fundamentally 
incompatible with Indigenous understandings, which encompass ‘the sum total of the material 
and spiritual activities’ of a people, and which, therefore, cannot be created or owned by any 
individual’ (Xanthaki 2007, 207). For Indigenous peoples, the term ‘culture’ is often used as 
shorthand for their myriad relationships with the land, plants, animals, and other human beings. 
For them, ‘culture’ commonly refers to all aspects of life: worldviews, value and knowledge 
systems, law, social organization, economies, and other land-based activities. The increasingly 
common Indigenous law-based policies governing ‘cultural heritage’ in Indigenous territories 
make this definitional continuity clear: the Nłeʔkepmxc of Shulus declare that, ‘our cultural 
heritage is both physical and spiritual; tangible and intangible,’ while the Simpcw Council 
include, under ‘cultural heritage resources,’ cultural expressions (songs, dances, art, stories, 
images, and designs), ‘locales of spiritual and ceremonial significance,’ ‘traditional use areas,’ 
traditional knowledge, plants and medicines, and any other site, practice, or item of historical 
or contemporary use or significance (Simpcw First Nation 2015; Lower Nicola Indian Band 
2017). The legal status of both of these documents extends the sphere of ‘culture’ to include 
Indigenous law and traditional governance; the definition and its expression are also 
 
 5 
inseparable, parts of the continuity. This is a holistic understanding – yet that same holism is 
susceptible to misrepresentations that render everything Indigenous peoples do and everything 
they have as simply ‘culture.’ In this way, the Lockean colonial hierarchy, in which the West 
has ‘societies’ and Indigenous peoples have mere ‘cultures,’ remains firmly in place. This 
extremely common framework continues to inform everyday discourse, effectively 
determining the way in which scholarship, human rights instruments, and politics are framed 
and organised. It erases the fact that Indigenous peoples are not only societies like any other, 
but also distinct polities with pre-existing governance and legal orders. 
Further, conceptualising Indigenous societies in terms of ‘culture’ makes the least 
demands of, and does not pose a threat to, the neoliberal, multicultural state. In fact, such a 
framing fits well with state efforts to display, if not commodify, Indigenous peoples’ cultures 
(cf. Engle 2010), while separating those ‘cultures’ from the lands from which they arise and to 
which they are inseparably linked (Grey and Patel 2015). Further, neoliberal multiculturalism 
strives to erase historical and political specificity, including experiences of past and ongoing 
colonialism, in order to re-cast Indigenous peoples as one minority among many, supplanting 
Indigenous inherent (political) rights with minority (cultural) rights (Grey and Newman 2018). 
Indigenous peoples thus become cultures instead of nations.  
Foundational to this misclassification is the enduring misunderstanding about the 
material objects displayed in public and private ‘collections:’ many of these are, in fact, 
expressions of Indigenous peoples’ social organization, political orders, legal systems, land-
based practices, and forms of governance. An example is the goavddis, the Sámi drum, used 
historically by the noaidi or shaman: while it is a material object, bearing a visual representation 
of the Sámi worldview, the drum is employed by an individual empowered and trained to assist 
the deliberative decision-making processes of a community. The knowledge, skills, and 
practices that accompany the drum enable its effective and purposeful use in Sámi collective 
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life. It is, in short, a tool of traditional governance. This fact both reflects a reality in which 
there is typically no separation between tangible and intangible elements of culture and makes 
it inappropriate to classify the goavddis as ‘cultural property’ separate from the actions and 
interactions that constitute its use (cf. Tsosie 2012). Partly as a result of such assertions, there 
have been growing calls for the reassessment of established understandings of material culture 
and increasing attention to the fact that the primary value of ‘culture’ does not necessarily lie 
in the tangible object or built form. Unfortunately, as Turnpenny notes, existing protection 
mechanisms ‘may be adequate for […] physical fabric, [but] they fail in terms of understanding 
and communicating wider cultural heritage values,’ as well as the broader knowledges and 
social practices related to the object or site, including histories, stories, and even language 
(2004, 298). The Statement on Hodinohsoni/Rotinonhsyonni Intellectual Rights & 
Responsibilities, which determines proper action in the handling of ‘cultural patrimony’ at Six 
Nations of the Grand River, articulates this same idea: ‘oral history, sacred objects, traditional 
practices, as well as the underlying philosophy and beliefs, cannot be protected from 
exploitation because they represent a worldview and mind-set that can only be understood by 




Like the word ‘culture,’ ‘heritage’ is frequently used to mean ‘all things to all people’ 
(Larkham 1995). As one scholar notes, ‘[t]oday the word ‘heritage’ is used to describe 
everything from brands of breakfast cereal to luxury tableware. It is seldom defined and often 
used unselfconsciously’ (Gibson 2017, 183). The concept is mired in connotations of a static 
past and frozen cultures, with an excessive focus on (once again) the material: objects, 
monuments, and landscapes. Heritage protection, though, has always been about land conflicts: 
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from concerns about urban sprawl, resulting in ‘green zones’ being established around Western 
metropolises; to the phenomenon of gentrification; to the creation of national parks and the 
accompanying ‘Yellowstone’ or ‘fortress’ model. 
In the 1990s a paradigm shift occurred, from preserving historic or ‘lost’ cultural 
traditions to embracing living cultures as well (Dahlström, 2003). Unfortunately, this 
reorientation largely orbited UNESCO’s 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (usually referred to as the World Heritage Convention, or 
WHC), the foundation of ‘authorised’ heritage discourse and the agreement that formalised, 
and gave legal heft to, the idea of a common, ‘heritage of all humanity’ (Smith 2006). 
According to UNESCO, ‘[w]hat makes the concept of World Heritage exceptional is its 
universal application. World Heritage sites belong to all the peoples of the world, irrespective 
of the territory on which they are located.’2 Such a framing disembeds heritage from territory, 
implicitly rejecting the claim that ‘protection’ and ‘promotion’ are localised governance issues. 
Further, the World Heritage Convention has a considerable gap ‘between the rhetoric on the 
international level and the actual political practices on a national and regional level’ 
(Heinämäki et al. 2017, 101). As a result, the WHC has not served Indigenous peoples well.  
The UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states that, ‘there have 
been repeated complaints by indigenous peoples and human rights organizations about 
violations of the rights of indigenous peoples in the implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention. There is no procedure to ensure the participation of Indigenous peoples in the 
nomination and management of World Heritage sites nor is there a policy to ensure their free, 
prior and informed consent to the nomination of such sites’ (EMRIP 2015, para. 38; UNPFII 
2013, para. 38). Instead, the WHC merely ‘recommends’ that States involve Indigenous 
peoples and respect their rights (Marsden 2014). This is particularly troubling as many of the 
sites on the World Heritage List are located in, or contain parts of, Indigenous peoples’ 
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territories. In fact, Indigenous peoples are only afforded a role in the ‘information gathering’ 
phase of the nomination process, wherein their lifeways and traditional knowledge are mined 
as ‘information sources’ in states’ claims about the ‘authenticity’ and ‘integrity’ of potential 
World Heritage Sites (Marsden 2014). Other major concerns include inadequate involvement 
of Indigenous peoples in the management of, and restrictions and prohibitions on Indigenous 
land-use activities in, some World Heritage sites, up to and including the forced relocation of 
Indigenous groups; the diversion of cultural heritage tourism earnings away from Indigenous 
communities; and the presentation, whether tacit or overt, of Indigenous peoples themselves as 
‘tourist attractions’ (IWGIA and Forest Peoples Programme 2015; Ween 2012; Viikari 2009). 
This is why, at a 2012 expert meeting in Copenhagen, The UN Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples recommended that the WHC be made consistent with the UNDRIP.  
Unsurprisingly, there have been growing calls, globally, for more substantive 
Indigenous participation in cultural heritage matters generally, and within the World Heritage 
Organization in particular – even (or especially) in the wake of the World Heritage 
Committee’s 2001 rejection of a proposed ‘World Heritage Indigenous peoples Council of 
Experts’ to advise Convention bodies (Viikari 2009). Yet despite these serious theoretical and 
practical failings, some scholars argue that the World Heritage Convention can still serve, in 
certain circumstances, as a tool for Indigenous peoples to reclaim not only their control of, but 
their right to, self-determination over their cultural heritage (Green 2009; Green and Turtinen 
2017). According to this literature, with careful planning, a clear strategy, and a willing state 







Since at least the 1970s, globally ‘heritage’ has blended with its green twin, 
conservation, in the task of ‘saving’ nature from the twin threats of decay and development, 
while recasting it as an exploitable cultural asset (Samuel 2008; Davison 2008; Hollowell and 
Nicholas 2009). In the 1980s, the near-simultaneous rise of, on the one hand, neoliberalism 
and, on the other, sustainable development created a counterintuitive synchronicity between 
the discourses of devolution and participation.3 An ‘idealized narrative’ quickly emerged 
across popular, academic, and governmental publications (Conley and Moote 2003, 372). In it, 
co-management4 is about solving resource problems and promoting conservation by harnessing 
local knowledge in a process that reduces the vulnerability and builds the internal capacity of 
resource-dependent communities, while improving state-Indigenous relations (Colfer 2005; Lu 
et al. 2012). Benefits to the state include gains in perceived legitimacy and a considerable 
reduction in management costs. 
Co-management, then, was being ideologically positioned as (ostensibly) a bridge 
between centralised state mechanisms (Holling and Meffe 1996) and self-regulation (Berkes 
1994). It was, in short, intended to either merely rhetorically or actually practically share 
decision-making authority between the state (as a resource ‘owner’) and the local community 
(as a resource ‘user’). Some authors expanded the binary dynamic of state-society to include 
the market as a third ‘stakeholder’ (Yandle 2003). This theoretical framing was meant to solve 
the longstanding regulatory conundrum of property that is commodifiable and highly desirable 
yet cannot be rendered ‘exclusive’ (i.e., for the exclusive use of certain parties, often by legal 
ownership or specific zoning): so-called ‘common resources,’ which were traditionally 
managed by the government alone, on behalf of all citizens. Initial definitions of co-
management were initially overly vague, yet this conceptual fuzziness did not curb the spread 
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of co-management as a policy prescription. By 2008, more than a dozen characterisations were 
circulating, and co-management had become ‘almost ubiquitous’ across a wide range of fields, 
from protected areas to fisheries, wildlife conservation, tourism, and rural development 
projects (Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004b, 834; Berkes 1994). The 
most basic definition remains a ‘sharing of rights and responsibilities by the government and 
civil society’ (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004b, 863), though there is little consistency, beyond 
this, in terminology, conceptual underpinnings, measures, or outcomes.  
Co-management as a phenomenon, however, has a much longer history, with evidence 
of it in legal agreements in 19th-century Spain and Norway (Guillet 2002; Jentoft 1989). 
Tellingly, the first modern legal arrangement, and the first instance of the actual term co-
management to describe such an arrangement, both occur in settler colonial contexts. In 1942, 
Gwich’in and Inuvialuit hunters presented the Canadian government with the assertion that 
Indigenous knowledge was too important to be omitted from decision-making about wildlife 
regulations in the Western Arctic. This meeting catalysed the first of many committees 
presenting a collective Indigenous voice in provincial/territorial and federal regulatory 
processes, which evolved into land claims bodies as oil and gas exploration got underway in 
the 1960s (Robinson 1999). A few years later, fourteen Pacific Northwestern tribes, asserting 
infringement of fishing rights, went up against the state of Washington, the Washington 
Department of Fisheries, the Washington Game Commission, and the Washington Reef Net 
Owners Association. The original treaty language from 1854 and 1855 – the Indigenous right 
to harvest fish ‘in common with’ settlers – was key in Federal District Judge George Boldt’s 
landmark 1974 decision to split the formerly state-managed commercial fishery, designating 
one half as ‘treaty-tribe’ and the remaining half as ‘all-citizen’ (Knutson 1987). Note that even 
this, though, contributed to the culturalization of Indigenous politics: while the dispute was 
over property rights, in this case they were specifically framed as cultural property rights – 
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worse, the tribes had a ‘culturally distinctive Indian relation to the […] resource’ in question 
(Knutson 1987), rather than a legal right to it. 
Mounting case studies worldwide indicate that co-management arrangements have four 
proximate causes, one of which is unique to Indigenous contexts – though Indigenous groups 
can and do figure in all four, and some cases show a combination of causes (Castro and Nielsen 
2001; Spak 2005; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Farrier and Adams 2011). Most are initiated 
from above, by states, in order to defuse political conflict, often as a response to high-profile 
activism. In some cases, co-management is proposed ‘from below,’ by local communities, in 
response to a variety of stresses, not all of them negative. Co-management also emerges as a 
state solution to resource crises, although the characterization of ‘crisis’ is frequently disputed 
(particularly by Indigenous groups responding to, for example, official wildlife population 
estimates and subsequent hunting quotas). Finally, co-management appears either as the state 
response to successful land claims challenges from Indigenous nations, or as a way for states 
to resolve Native title issues short of Indigenous self-determination. 
Globally, cultural heritage co-management has rapidly become a major movement5 in 
environmental and political relations with Indigenous peoples, driven by the rise of Indigenous 
rights in the international arena and the recent recognition of Native title across many settler 
states (Goetze 2005; Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004a). States have tended to pursue these 
arrangements with certain Indigenous formations: those groups found in relatively peripheral 
areas, remote from bureaucratic control and where they constitute a majority; who maintain 
strong connections to the land, relying on terrestrial or sea resources for subsistence (and 
sometimes commercial) activity; and in whose territories traditional land tenure, management, 
and knowledge systems (including Indigenous language) persist, yet formal land claims have 
not (yet) emerged. Some of the resources found in or on these Indigenous territories will be 
viewed as in decline or under threat, and there will typically be industrial interest in some other 
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portion of the resource base. Often, the Indigenous people in question will have a history of 
agitating for territorial rights (Mulrennan and Scott 2005). Not for nothing, then, does Imai 
(2009, 310) bluntly characterize co-management regimes as ‘[a] softer way for governments to 
access Indigenous lands.’ 
 
From co-management of, to self-determination over, Indigenous cultural heritage 
 
Similarities between negotiating co-management agreements and treatymaking in the 
later colonial period are noteworthy. Indigenous peoples are often backed into co-management 
where the state asserts absolute jurisdiction, in an attempt to contain the damage being done to 
territory, authority, and practice – or all three. The agreements can also be rolled back or grossly 
undermined even after being entered into, if the state develops an overriding interest in strategic 
access (for example, waterways) or natural resource development in, around, or on Indigenous 
territories. Because the rights, interests, and priorities of Indigenous peoples were never the 
main impetus (they are what Mulrennan and Scott (2005) call a ‘derivative motivation’), this 
is an eminently foreseeable, and consequently widely feared, outcome of co-management. For 
negotiations to even approach fairness, bargaining power is key – and varies inversely with the 
level of actionable interest extractive industries have in the land in question (Haller et al. 2008). 
In Canada, for example, Indigenous co-management in the forestry sector has been relatively 
more successful because (a) forestry is a key element of the national economy, (b) First Nations 
have either existing or pending land claims encompassing significant swaths of timber 
resources, and (c) clearcutting has impacted non-Indigenous populations as well as First 
Nations communities, and high-profile solidarity activism around this practice (for example, 
the ‘Clayquot Sound protests’) has garnered significant international attention (Wyatt 2008). 
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By way of contrast, and as a norm in countries with no history of settler treatymaking, many 
Indigenous groups often cannot even get to co-management.6 
It is not merely the practice of co-management, then, but the paradigm itself, that is the 
problem; accordingly, it cannot be ‘tweaked’ to provide better outcomes for Indigenous 
peoples. This is the case because co-management is not just an administrative arrangement, 
but an international rights regime, ratified and enacted (i.e., governed) at the national level 
through policies and practices, that actively displaces Indigenous rights and Indigenous 
governance. It affords a method of enacting self-determination well short of, and in violation 
of the spirit and intent of, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
Further, this interlocking schema – the rights regime and the governance thereof – reinforces 
the culturalization of Indigenous peoples and polities generally. And as a rights regime and 
governance system that shuts out the Indigenous in favour of the state, co-management cannot 
be a stepping stone to Indigenous self-determination. It cannot even be a means of producing 
the much less aspirational ‘genuinely shared’ jurisdiction over Indigenous cultural heritage. It 
is, in fact, almost never described as an interim measure of any kind, but instead as intended to 
‘create a permanent, institutionalised relationship between governments and representative 
aboriginal bodies’ (Usher 1997).  
The solution, then, is not to improve co-management, but to remove it as a barrier to 
Indigenous peoples’ governance over their own cultural heritage. The modern colonial origins 
of Indigenous cultural heritage co-management are significant because they establish 
something of a trend: co-management as simultaneously reflective of Indigenous perspectives 
and a perversion of those perspectives; enacted by communities as a defense against further 
political encroachment and by states as a foil against Indigenous self-determination. Instead of 
acting as a ‘bridge’ between dissimilar but potentially synergistic systems, co-management 
augments – and arguably, is intended to augment – the pre-existing institutional arrangements 
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of the nation-state and the international state system. Ultimately, it shores up state governance 
by tweaking the regulatory frameworks, policy tools, and dispute resolution mechanisms 
already in place (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004b). On top of all of this can be found what 
Farrier and Adams refer to as communities’ ‘unmet aspirations’ (2011, 2) for cultural heritage 
co-management, along with several problematic, unintended side-effects that crop up in even 
the most successful cases. To begin with, co-management agreements extend state power into 
matters that are often already successfully managed locally,7 while increasing government 
monitoring of Indigenous groups – this is Ferguson’s (1994) classic ‘anti-politics machine’ in 
action (Caruso 2011; Nadasdy 2005; Spak 2005). 
The relevant international instruments, including the World Heritage Convention, focus 
on the management of Indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage, or their participation in decision- 
and policymaking. In so doing, these global agreements violate the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) which, in establishing to the norm of 
Indigenous self-determination, forms the basis of Indigenous peoples’ governance of their 
cultural heritage (Tsosie 2012). Self-determination is the foundational norm of international 
law bestowed to all peoples, including Indigenous peoples, and ‘governance’ (or ‘self-
government’) is the practical shape it takes in the political-legal realm. It is thus properly under 
this rubric that the protection of ‘cultural heritage’ ultimately resides.  
Indigenous representatives typically endorse self-determination as a fundamental 
human right, according to which ‘human beings, individually and as groups, are equally 
entitled to be in control of their own destinies, and to live within governing institutional orders 
that are devised accordingly’ (Anaya 2009, 187). In spite of distinct processes or different legal 
purposes, the ultimate goal of self-determination is similar among the world’s Indigenous 
peoples: autonomous authority and decision-making power over their own affairs. It is the right 
to and practice of self-determination that enables Indigenous peoples to remain distinct by 
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practicing their own laws, customs, and land tenure systems through their institutions, and in 
accordance with their traditions. Besides the recognition and exercise of political autonomy, 
an equally important normative dimension of Indigenous self-determination is active 
engagement in broader social and political structures, which often means interaction with and 
participation in the institutions of the state. These two forms of engagement are not mutually 
exclusive, nor do they evidence hypocrisy or ambivalence about Indigenous participation in 
their own political and legal orders.  
Every society has its own governance systems and ways of expressing and describing 
how they govern. Simply put: governance is about a people choosing collectively how they 
organise themselves to run their own affairs and make decisions; share power, authority, and 
responsibilities; deal with internal dissent and heterogeneity of opinion and perspective; and 
design the necessary tools to implement decisions. Governance is thus much more than 
management or administration, and it is also different from government. Whereas 
‘government’ refers to the governing institutions (legislatures, court system, administration), 
‘governance’ emphasises the broader processes of which institutions are a part (Abele 2007). 
‘Indigenous governance’ is a term that recognises that Indigenous peoples have had, and in 
many cases, continue to have, their own forms and institutions of governance and law. These 
may vary from informal and localised decision-making processes to complex, centralised, 
formal structures (Fondahl and Irlbacher-Fox 2009).  
In the sphere of cultural heritage, the strategies adopted by Indigenous groups, and their 
successes, tend to reflect their bargaining power within a given neoliberal multicultural state. 
In the US, for example, Indigenous peoples ‘have full authority to regulate their tangible and 
intangible cultural heritage under tribal law’ (Tsosie 2012, 243). However, available 
protections are not only wan, but apply largely to material objects (Tsosie 2012). In Canada, 
some comprehensive land claims agreements provide the legal framework for Indigenous 
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nations and communities to govern cultural heritage according to their own priorities and needs 
(Ford 2017).8 This being said, groups without a land claims agreement in place have 
nevertheless actively asserted governance over their cultural heritage. For example, Sts’ailes, 
a nation in British Columbia’s lower mainland that has refused to participate in the provincial 
treaty process, drafted a comprehensive Cultural Heritage Resources Policy in 2010 that 
includes both a philosophy of stewardship and actual mechanisms of management – Indigenous 
legal procedures they insist on being the binding regulation in their territory (Sts’ailes 
Aboriginal Rights & Title Department 2010). There are other examples of Indigenous peoples 
in the United States (including the Navajo, Hopi, and Zuni) successfully incorporating their 
spiritual, social and historical values into the governance of their culturally significant sites and 
heritage (see, among others, Turnpenny 2004); while additional, oft-cited examples include the 
co-management of Uluru-Kata Tjuta, in Australia, and the agreements in place (including those 
‘creating’) the province of Nunavut, in Canada (see, among many others, Ross et al. 2009; 
Rodon 1998; Ford 2017).  
The stakes in this are high, and although there have been encouraging shifts in the policy 
environment, enthusiastic optimism is premature. Borrini-Feyerabend and Hill note that, in 
conservation, there has already been a movement away from ‘management’ (defined as ‘what 
is done in pursuit of given objectives’) toward ‘governance’ (defined as ‘who decides what is 
to be done and how those decisions are taken’) (2015, 171). Yet recently there have also been 
vigorous, renewed calls for a return to power-blind, state-centric approaches, labelled 
‘protectionist’ and ‘the new conservation science’ (as well as ‘authoritarian’) (Wilshusen et al. 
2002; Doak et al. 2014). This makes the question of ‘management’ especially urgent, since the 
meagre ground gained for and by Indigenous peoples under the rubric of co-management – 
along with the question of whether and what better systems might be built on that foundation 




Cultural heritage protection in Sápmi 
 
In Sápmi, since 2001, only the Sámi Parliament in Norway has been delegated the 
authority to manage Sámi cultural heritage. Their focus is on documenting and protecting 
historic cultural and sacred sites and buildings, including oral tradition and knowledge 
pertaining to these locations. Somewhat problematically, the connection to present-day social 
practices and values is not well established – or at least not well communicated to the public.9 
Additionally, Sámi governance of cultural heritage does not feature strongly in research or 
public debate, if at all.  
 
Co-management in Laponia 
 
In making their optimistic claims about the success of co-management ‘done right,’ 
authors cite various specific iterations, one of the most common of which is the UNESCO 
World Heritage Site of Laponia in Northern Sweden (Heinämäki et al. 2017). Membership on 
the World Heritage List confers a certain global prestige, while also promising economic 
benefits,10 and Sweden has the highest number of such sites per capita of any country. Spanning 
nearly 10,000 square kilometers and consisting of four national parks and two nature reserves, 
Laponia constitutes ‘one of the last and the largest and the best preserved areas of 
transhumance’11 (Marsden 2014, 241). It was nominated on a number of criteria: besides its 
unique natural qualities and geomorphology, ranging from glacial activity to marshlands and 
primeval forests, it was ‘an outstanding example of traditional land-use, a cultural landscape 
reflecting the ancestral way of life of the Sámi people based around the seasonal herding of 
reindeer’ (UNESCO 2018). Laponia is one of very few World Heritage ‘mixed sites,’12 
 
 18 
combining natural and cultural elements, and is often cited as a leading example of Sámi self-
determination in practice.13 
The path to this co-management arrangement was a long and extremely difficult one. 
Initially, the Swedish government sought to nominate Laponia as a World Heritage Site only 
on natural criteria: the proposed area included some of the very first national parks in Europe, 
established at the turn of the twentieth century, which from that time had been classified as 
simply ‘wilderness.’ (Sweden was an early, and committed, adopter of the ‘Yellowstone 
model,’ or ‘fortress’ conservation.) The application was rejected, though, based on a lack of 
‘outstanding universal value’ under this designation (Svels and Sande 2016; Ween 2012). The 
Sámi Parliament in Sweden and local Sámi reindeer herding districts got involved in drafting 
a new application based on both natural and cultural criteria, seeing the establishment of a 
formally designated site as, at least potentially, a key step toward self-governance (Green and 
Turtinen 2014). The timing, here, is important: these initiatives paced with growing criticism, 
globally, of Indigenous exclusion from world heritage discourses, practices, and policymaking. 
Nevertheless, from the outset the process was characterized by mutual mistrust between state 
agencies and the Sámi, who felt tokenized, leading to sentiments about Laponia epitomizing 
the ‘colonial structure’ of the Swedish bureaucracy. The inclusion of ‘cultural criteria’ (i.e., the 
Indigenous component) in the Laponia application was given a very short timeframe for 
completion and was widely criticized by the local Sámi. It was also ‘tacked on’ to what 
remained essentially the same, previously rejected nomination package (Green and Turtinen 
2017), excluding the Sámi ontology of ‘nature’ – and thus, ironically, Sámi culture – in the 
process. For its part, the Swedish state had initially tried to nominate the site as a ‘natural 
landscape’ rather than a ‘mixed site’ precisely in order to circumvent the possibility of co-
management, which it characterized as having little potential. The reclassification of the site, 
by definition entailing Sámi involvement in its management, was the recommendation of the 
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WHC advisory bodies, and was strongly opposed by the Swedish government (Marsden 
2014).14 
Once Laponia was approved as a Heritage Site, local Sámi saw it as a great opportunity 
to begin considering Indigenous governance and building a transferrable management model.15 
However, token inclusion and the visibly unequal power relations between the parties in the 
application process carried over to negotiations about its management (Heinämäki et al. 2017). 
As one Sámi woman involved in the process put it, the state authorities attempted to carry out 
‘business as usual’ with no serious interest in Sámi culture, perspectives, or input into decision-
making – or any involvement at all, beyond merely inviting them to meetings and hearing their 
opinions.16 The site had, prior to the World Heritage designation, been managed by the state 
alone, and the government was keen to maintain its monopoly ‘say’ (Green and Turtinen 2014). 
After a handful of such encounters, some Sámi began to think about the process more closely 
vis-à-vis the fact that Laponia was about their territory, their lives, and their livelihoods. This 
coincided with discussions about Sámi self-determination more generally.  
Initially, the Sámi and their concerns were ignored, but after several years of meetings, 
working groups, and internal discussions, a few Sámi participants decided to put forward an 
unprecedented proposal for an Indigenous majority in the co-management of Laponia.17 For 
some Sámi this was too big a demand, while others hesitated to make such a request of the 
state. Their hesitation was justified, given that the proposal was immediately rejected by the 
federal government and municipal representatives, who wanted to negotiate other items first. 
The Sámi refused, though, stating that without an agreement on the foundational issue of 
representation the negotiations could not move forward. Unsurprisingly, the talks subsequently 
stalled for several years. The key Sámi individuals would not abandon their decolonizing 
agenda and promised a full Sámi withdrawal from the Laponia process should the state not 
honour the majority demand – a move that would have effectively put an end to the Heritage 
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Site. The state responded by arguing that the idea would not work in practice and could not be 
approved due to a lack of precedent anywhere in Scandinavia.18 It took fifteen years of 
repetitive rounds of meetings and stalled talks before a co-management organization 
(Laponiatjuottjudus) was established, in 2011, with Sámi majority, a Sámi chair, the inclusion 
of Sámi as the second official language in all written documents, and a consensus decision-
making model.19 This resolution, for some parties, would almost certainly have been fuelled 
by UNESCO’s threat to withdraw Laponia’s candidacy altogether (Holmgren et al. 2017). 
In some ways, Laponiatjuottjudus breaks new ground, for example by foregrounding 
traditional Sámi knowledge and drawing on Sámi ways of organizing and working, such as 
holding regular public meetings (rádedibme) for local input. In other ways, it remains ‘within 
normative bureaucratic structures’ (Heinämäki et al. 2017, 99). Green and Turtinen describe 
how ‘the Sami in leading positions [still] have to adapt to existing rules and regulations and 
work through bureaucratic means’ and ‘follow […] goals and aims that have been set up 
nationally’ (2014, 64; 2017, 193). As for the question of it being an example of Indigenous 
self-determination: not everyone agrees. A Sámi reindeer herder from a district within the 
Heritage Site points out that Laponia is a model of local management with an Indigenous 
majority; it is not, however, Sámi governance – and this distinction is important. He suggests 
it is a good start with great potential but is hampered by a lack of skilled Sámi individuals to 
occupy the field, so to speak. As he put it: ‘if all the educated Sámi came back to Sápmi, we’d 
have the competence to fill up all the positions all the way to the top, and perhaps then could 
start talking about Sámi governance.’20 Further, analyses that focus on the Sámi majority and 
consensus model as ‘facts’ tend to overlook the adage that consensus is a process, not a result, 
along with the ways that power structures this process – for example, how the state and 
municipalities (who together constitute 44% of the co-management organization) still hold a 
near-monopoly on authorized and actionable knowledge, along with the resources to gather 
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and mobilize it. As Maraud and Guyot put it: ‘Sweden’s role on the board remains very strong’ 
(2016, 208). Other, practical challenges vis-à-vis self-determination lie with the exclusion of 
Sámi place names from maps and signs; limited local participation; and the underfunding of an 
underpowered Laponiatjuottjudus (Heinämäki et al. 2017; Reimerson 2016). Meanwhile, on 
the ground, Sámi reindeer herders have protested that their livelihoods are being turned into 
‘museum practice,’ performed for tourists, rather than framed and supported as a modern 
economic activity; and since Laponia includes only a portion of the actual (and indeed, the 
most critical) grazing lands of their communities, their cultural heritage remains arguably 
unprotected (Ween 2012; Reimerson 2017). 
Unfortunately, the political will to shore up the governance deficits at Laponia is not 
only lacking but pushing in in the opposite direction: the majority of Jokkmokk municipal 
council (the largest town in the vicinity of the World Heritage Site) has recently announced 
that it wants the state to assume responsibility for the management of Laponia, either through 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency or the county administrative board. According 
to some councillors, Laponiatjuottjudus has become too politicized, preventing businesses 
from establishing and operating in the World Heritage Area (Pettersson 2017). The Jokkmokk 
municipal council has also challenged the Sámi presidency of Laponiatjuottjudus and argued 
for a rotating chairperson between all members of the board. Since the establishment of 
Laponiatjuottjudus, the chair has been elected from the nine Sámi communities involved in the 
Laponia co-management regime. The dispute has effectively undermined the agreed terms of 
Laponiatjuottjudus, created an internal strife within the nine Sámi communities and led to the 
resignation of the chair (Niia 2018; Sunna 2018). 
In 1993 Sweden ‘delegated’ conservation of Sámi culture to the Sámi Parliament, while 
the conservation of nature (along with resource development in protected areas) has remained 
the sole jurisdiction of the Swedish Ministry of the Environment. Moreover, this bifurcation 
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operates against the backdrop of state non-recognition of any Sámi right to land (Svels and 
Sande 2016; Reimerson 2016; Sande 2015). Thus, Sámi heritage is rendered if not purely 
immaterial, certainly non-territorial. In the actual texts and procedures around the co-
management of Laponia, even in the rare instances when they are acknowledged as Indigenous 
(rather than a local group or ethnic minority) the Sámi are first culturalized, after which their 
culture is instrumentalized: they are repositories of cultural knowledge, necessary to make the 
site an efficient enterprise, and bearers of cultural values, necessary to make the site a matter 
of ‘world heritage’ (Reimerson 2016). In no framing are they holders of Indigenous rights of 
any kind, never mind the specific right to self-determination of their own cultural heritage.  
Successful and sustainable Sámi governance of what is now Laponia, in fact, long 
predates not only the World Heritage Site but the national parks and nature reserves that are its 
component parts. Sande refers to this prior system specifically when she calls Laponia ‘a lesson 
of sustainable self-management from prehistory to the present time’ (2015, 802). Why then, 
was that system not the basis for a (re)new(ed) cultural heritage protection arrangement? 
Perhaps because, as Green and Turtinen note, ‘[t]he idea of a Sámi-designed management and 
conservation system seemed to the authorities implausible, unnecessary, and undoable’ (2017, 
192). This posture is both cause and consequence of the aforementioned culturalization, 
prevalent in discourse from the everyday, to the academic, to the governmental. Proponents of 
co-management acknowledge this bias as an initial hurdle only, asserting that the Sámi have 
successfully ‘indigenized’ the management of the site; further, some refer to this as the first 
stirrings of a wider movement. The extent to which Laponiatjuottjudus’ incorporation of Sámi 
ontology, epistemology, and axiology, and ways of living and working that flow from these, 
might truly form the ‘thin end of the wedge’ in changing the praxis of cultural heritage 
protection in Sweden – or even just at Laponia – is unknown. If such a change is possible, it 
will unfold at a glacial pace, and would still operate within the bounds of existing normative 
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conceptual frameworks and governance structures. The process is just as likely to produce 
further conformation of Sámi to the dominant system, as they are slowly drawn into the 
‘Eurocentric synthesis’ (Battiste and Henderson 2000). 
 
The Suttesája case 
  
Located in the northernmost part of Finland, the natural spring of Suttesája belongs to a larger 
area considered sacred by many Sámi. This is evident, for instance, in Sámi place names, 
several of which begin with the word for ‘sacred’ (bassi), and in the fact that it contains one of 
the three Áilegas peaks, which are among most revered Sámi mountains. The Suttesája area is 
designated a heritage site of cultural and historical significance in the registry of the Finnish 
National Board of Antiquities, as well as being one of the largest natural springs in Europe, 
which feeds an important watershed (Deatnu/Tana). While Suttesája continues to be a place of 
spiritual, historical, and cultural significance for many local Sámi, knowledge, and appreciation 
of the area declined after the imposition of Christianity several generations ago. There have 
been two attempts to establish a water bottling venture at Suttesája, to sell its natural spring 
water to increasingly thirsty world markets. Any such initiative would have to satisfy 
constitutional protections of Sámi culture – but at issue, here, is the fact that none of the 
constitutionally-recognized and affirmed, ‘integral’ Sámi cultural rights (for example, to 
engage in reindeer herding) are in play. Instead, the development of the spring presents myriad, 
cumulative threats to spirituality, heritage, and identity. Moreover, the Finnish Constitution is 
vague about the cultural rights and obligations it imposes on government decision-makers, 




The water bottling project was first proposed in 2001, initiated by the 
Ohcejohka/Utsjoki municipality in collaboration with representatives from the Regional 
Environmental Centre of Lapland, but without informing – never mind consulting with – the 
Indigenous communities, or other interest groups who stood to be affected (Kuokkanen and 
Bulmer 2006). This venture was quietly withdrawn three years later, as the result of a legal 
appeal, by four local Sámi, centered on the aforementioned, hazy meaning of ‘Sami culture.’ 
Nevertheless, the water bottling idea was revived in 2016, this time with a handful of local 
Sámi entrepreneurs (reflecting the internal divides wrought by colonialism, including or 
especially fractures along the lines demarcating ‘sacredness’). The logic and strategy were the 
same as before: ironically, to vehemently deny the sacredness of the site while emphasizing 
the economic potential of selling ‘sacred’ water to the world. Predictably, environmental and 
‘cultural impact’ assessments engaged with neither Sámi history nor Sámi oral tradition 
(Kuokkanen and Bulmer 2006). Another public campaign of opposition ensued. This time the 
venture was stopped by Metsähallitus, the state-owned enterprise administering the ‘state-
owned’ land in Finland, which declined to grant the applicants a lease in the area in May 2017, 
and again in March 2018.21 
In the absence of measures foreclosing the next round of economic development 
proposals, Suttesája remains vulnerable to devastating exploitation – but what is the best way 
to protect the spring and its surroundings along with its broader meaning, and the values and 
knowledge that are attached to the area? Further, how can this be accomplished in a way that 
maintains and strengthens the significance of Suttesája to present-day practices and lives of 
local Sámi? ‘Better’ co-management, correcting the weaknesses evidenced at Laponia, is 
certainly an option; but not only is the evidence from that site discouraging, even its most 
impressive accomplishments are fragile at best. Certainly, many Sámi in Norway think so: they 
have, for years, resisted the extension of Laponia into their territory, despite the fact such a 
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transnationalization of the World Heritage Site would, to some extent, erase one of the borders 
that arbitrarily divides Sápmi. They fear that a Norwegian World Heritage Site would actually 
diminish the rights they currently exercise under Norway’s ratification of the International 
Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (ILO 169) (Svels and 
Sande 2016). Anders Urheim, a local Sámi leader at the proposed site, described the shield 
World Heritage status affords as far from additive; rather, in his words, it amounts to being 
‘protected to death’ (cited in Ween 2012, 262). Interestingly, they have used ILO 169 to block 
the establishment of a national park at Tysfjord-Hellemo, a prerequisite for nominating the 
extended Laponia site to the World Heritage List (Ween 2012). Throughout their resistance, 
Sámi inside of Norway have cited the difficulties at Laponia (Sande 2015).  
With Finland having, like Sweden, failed to ratify ILO 169, these contrasting examples 
become particularly meaningful in evaluating the potential of World Heritage status in the 
Finnish case. Improvement on Laponia’s outcomes becomes even less likely in light of the fact 
that official bodies representing Indigenous peoples in Finland, including the Sámi Parliament 
and the Sámi Council (an NGO), have been ineffective in pursuit of greater recognition and 
protection of Sámi rights nationally (Kuokkanen and Bulmer 2006). This is on top of the fact 
that seeking protection under the World Heritage Site system entails navigating a lengthy, 
tedious process in which there is no guarantee of approval. More fundamentally, however, if 
the objective is Indigenous governance of cultural heritage under the established international 
legal norm of self-determination, a co-management agreement falls well short. In Laponia, as 
discussed above, it produced a local, rather than Indigenous body to co-manage, rather than 





Seeking alternatives to co-management 
 
The rise of ‘co-management’ to prominence has been problematic not only for the 
reasons we have already outlined, but also because that its dominance has eclipsed 
consideration (or even awareness) of alternatives. Those alternatives have, to date, been more 
regularly explored not in cultural heritage praxis per se, but the closely related sphere of 
biodiversity conservation. In fact, the two – ‘heritage’ and ‘conservation’ – have begun to 
overlap in interesting ways, as Indigenous peoples strive for legal and political recognition of 
their own institutions and assert the inseparability of their cultures (tangible and intangible), 
histories, and territories. Nevertheless, this conversation has been both richer and more 
productive in the realm of conservation than that of heritage (or cultural heritage), where 
mainstream discussions of unique mechanisms, rooted in Indigenous rather than state or 
international law, date back decades. 
We chose our illustrative case, the Parque de la Papa, not only because it locates the 
productive consonances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous rights regimes, but because 
they operationalize the underlying spirit that unites Indigenous rights instruments (like the 
UNDRIP and ILO 169) with the corpus of international jurisprudence, while specifically 
enacting local Indigenous laws. This is a sui generis system that reterritorializes and 
repoliticizes Indigenous rights both discursively and practically, developing a working model 
for the in situ, community-based governance of cultural heritage.  
 
Peru: The Parque de la Papa Indigenous Biocultural Heritage Territory 
 
The concept of ‘biocultural diversity’ arises from a recognition of the link between 
knowledge, culture, and ecology, rooted in the discovery of a correlation between the global 
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loss of biodiversity and the global decline in language groups (Maffi and Woodley 2008). 
Indigenous peoples – who have always asserted this nature-culture nexus – have creatively 
built on the concept of biocultural diversity by further linking it to both heritage and territory. 
In 2005, a workshop involving Indigenous peoples from India, China, Kenya, Panama, and 
Peru introduced the term ‘biocultural heritage:’ a ‘complex system of interdependent parts 
centered on the reciprocal relationship between indigenous peoples and their natural 
environment’ (Argumedo and Pimbert 2008, 6; Swiderska 2005). Immediately on the heels of 
this, a group of Andean communities operationalized the term, moving it into the legal and 
policy arena by coining the designation, ‘Indigenous Biocultural Heritage Territory’ (IBCHT). 
A sui generis system for protecting Indigenous peoples’ rights (including legal security of 
traditional lands and resources) and pursuing endogenous development (including local, 
sustainable livelihoods), IBCHTs are community-governed areas in which goals are defined 
and pursued through Indigenous institutions, knowledge, values, and practices. The underlying 
argument is that Indigenous systems must be safeguarded ‘within their own cultural, temporal 
and spatial dimensions using a combination of protective tools’ (ANDES 2013).  
The first Indigenous Biocultural Heritage Territory was the 12,000-ha Parque de la 
Papa, located in the Peruvian altiplano. Twenty years ago, six highland villages of Amaru, 
Chawaytire, Cuyo Grande, Pampallaqta, Paru Paru, and Sacaca joined together as a federated 
entity, modelled on the Andean ayllu (community/extended kinship) system, Quechua 
socioeconomic principles (balance, harmony, and reciprocity/mutuality), and the Indigenous 
philosophy of sumaq kawsay (literally, ‘beautiful life’). Governance herein is based in Quechua 
law and institutions and operates through community organizations rather than governments or 
‘hybrid’ institutions. Overall leadership is provided by the Association of Communities of the 
Parque de la Papa, a collective (but independent) decision-making body, which operates 
according to customary norms and practices, and according to shared values and beliefs, across 
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issue areas such as land use, food systems, and livelihoods. The founding of the Association 
followed traditional protocols, using local structures and processes, and was mapped out and 
mandated by the communities themselves. A central element of this body is the Council, 
consisting of one individual elected from each of the villages, who acts as a conduit to his or 
her own, ‘home’ community. The Association is empowered to endorse and initiate revenue-
raising activities within, by, and for the Parque, which unfold according to a binding, inter-
community benefit-sharing agreement that was, itself, based on Quechua laws and principles 
(especially the abovementioned reciprocity/mutuality, or ayni in Runasimi), developed 
collaboratively across all five communities, and ratified by each. The bargaining power of the 
constituent villages increased when vested in this collective body, which is the official entity 
that enters into legal agreements with outside actors. 
Other aspects (or levels) of governance are carried out by local, inter- and intra-village 
bodies: community assemblies, where knowledge is shared, issues reflected on and dialogued, 
and problems ‘workshopped’; a series of something like ‘standing committees’ convened to 
address particular problems or opportunities (including ‘microenterprise groups,’ for example 
weaving and cooking collectives, and ‘study groups’); and networks that link these groups 
across communities and with outside organizations, both laterally and horizontally, and see 
community members and collectives participating in events at the local, regional, and global 
level. Members of each community can participate in all institutional structures and processes. 
Runasimi (rather than Spanish) is the official language of governance in the Parque de la Papa; 
further, thoroughgoing Quechua principles and practices support the oral intergenerational and 
intercommunity transmission/diffusion of knowledge. 
It is noteworthy that this communal arrangement is neither small-scale nor was it easily 
undertaken: prior to the formation of the Parque, the 6,000 residents of the six villages had 
been embroiled in a longstanding conflict over land title in first the colonial, then the post-
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colonial Peruvian land tenure system (Apgar 2017). Nor has the path to effective Indigenous 
governance of the territory been smooth or direct. The Parque was initially listed as a 
‘Community-Conserved Area’ (CCA) upon its founding in 1998. CCAs are a designation of 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, characterized by the organization as 
one of four possible modes of governance in protected areas: private, state, co-management, 
and community based. In reality, though, most Community-Conserved Areas operate under co-
management of some stripe, whether or not an explicit agreement is in place, and whether or 
not ‘shared governance’ – which describes the majority of these protected areas – is 
acknowledged as co-management. At the time, in the region, registration as a CCA was the 
available option that best met Quechua aspirations. Yet the communities’ participation in the 
workshop that gave rise to the IBHT concept was driven, in large part, by their dissatisfaction 
with the shortcomings of the IUCN approach, and correlate disillusionment with its longer-
term potential, after only seven years of operation as a Community-Conserved Area. 
In the Parque de la Papa, local authorities – both community leaders and technical 
experts – are identified through a community-built consensus process using a Quechua-
grounded matrix of personal merit, traditional knowledge, and experience. With the guidance 
of these authorities, the confederated villages have built a multifaceted, local solidarity 
economy; undertaken collaborative research to document and, where appropriate, disseminated 
traditional knowledge; negotiated and entered into agreements with external, public and 
private-sector partners of their choosing, collectively drafting community protocols to ethically 
and legally guide those interactions, participating in national and international policy processes, 
and co-authoring binding contracts and regional ordinances (Grey 2011). These last two tools 
of governance – bilateral hybrid instruments and community protocols – are new juridical 
instruments, flowing from Indigenous legal systems but legally compatible with (and, in fact, 
reinforcing) the corpus of human rights law.22  
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First formally recorded in the negotiations leading up to the Nagoya Protocol, they 
protect everything from cultivars within the Parque, to the Indigenous knowledge of the 
inhabitants, to the traditional structures and processes that steer the work therein; and include 
precedent-setting legislation prohibiting biopiracy, banning GMOs, repatriating material and 
immaterial heritage, registering Indigenous knowledge and the products thereof (thereby 
fighting patenting and other forms of alienation and commodification), and guiding non-
Indigenous researcher behavior (Grey 2011). In drafting a protocol, principles of local Quechua 
law are consulted, derivatives of these principles are created, and from these derivatives 
guidelines are developed. The end product is a written document that the communities can 
recognize and affirm because of its familiarity. This is not a contract but a living agreement 
that reflects the complex systems and relationships of Andean ayllus (traditional communities) 
enshrines Quechua principles of rakinakuy (equilibrium), yanantin (duality), and ayninakuy 
(reciprocity); and which can be further negotiated should either local, Indigenous or wider, 
mainstream laws change. The Parque has used this methodology to create several successful 
biocultural protocols. These include internal arrangements for benefit-sharing within the 
confederation of communities, calling on behavioural norms and traditional mechanisms of 
redistribution based in economic solidarity; and agreements with external actors such as the 
International Potato Centre (CIP)23 and Biodiversity International (both members of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research), Wisconsin University, the 
University of Toronto, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (Grey 2011). 
The confederation of the original six constituent communities into a single structure – 
a community made up of communities, an ayllu within an ayllu – without this entailing a loss 
of autonomy or particular affiliation, catalyzed a consolidation of and confidence in Quechua 
practices, knowledges, and identities (Muller 2006); while collectively overcoming certain key 
challenges and winning several important strategic victories amplified this effect.  In the late 
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2000s, that catalysis reverberated through the different generations and genders living in the 
valley, with women and youth playing a strong (and increasingly prominent) role in the 
reconstitution effort (Argumedo and Wong 2010). Gender equality in the governance of the 
Parque is culturally rooted in the principle of yanantin, which is stitched into lived systems as 
the enacting of mutually reinforcing rights and obligations for both men and women. Women 
are considered to be equal holders, deployers, and embedders of cultural values in the workings 
of the communities and hold specific knowledge and practices considered essential to 
revitalization efforts – without their equal participation, rakinakuy and ayninakuy cannot be 
achieved. This wasn’t some timeless, noble, intact tradition, though: women in the Parque talk 
about having to work for their place at the table and prove their competence (even to their own 
husbands); to assert their right to participate, to lead, to contribute (see, for example, Tapia and 
De la Torre 1998).  
Women can and do occupy elected offices, and additionally assume key roles in sub-
Assembly, inter- and intra-community decision-making bodies (for example, committees and 
working groups, including those that assign the communal labour essential to local agricultural 
production). Several economic collectives are made up exclusively of women, or are organized 
around the preservation, application, and intergenerational transmission of women’s traditional 
knowledge, for example of medicinal plants in the Parque (the collective for which is called 
Sipas Warmi, or ‘young women,’ as it uses a mentorship model to pair Elder Quechua women 
knowledge-holders with younger apprentices). Tijillay T’ika is another women’s collective, 
this one mandated with documenting local Indigenous knowledge broadly through Runasimi-
language media, and computer-editing, digitally storing, and securely protecting access to that 
media, which qualifies as a legal register of collective intellectual property (Dias and da Costa 
2008). Women also hold the power to redistribute wealth through their central role in the 
network of barter markets that operate in the altiplano. Herein, as the key traders, mothers and 
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daughters consciously tip economic exchanges in favour of the most vulnerable households 
(Pimbert 2005; ANDES 2005). 
‘Indigenous Biocultural Heritage Territory’ is self-applied designation, not yet legally 
recognized, but one that nonetheless provides ‘a platform from which to reclaim […] rights 
that already exist under national and international law’ (Sayre et al. 2017, 104). Those rights 
are drawn from, and carefully reconcile, a variety of both legally binding and ‘soft law’ 
instruments: from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and WHC, to the explicitly Indigenous rights delineated in ILO Convention 169 and 
the UNDRIP. Thus far the designation has been applied to specifically agroecological areas, 
but there is no reason it could not be more broadly taken up, adapted, and elaborated. The 
definition of ‘bioculture’ leaves the materiality and relationality of the territorial element 
undefined, after all: each community will have its own unique iteration of a ‘complex system 
of interdependent parts centered on the reciprocal relationship between indigenous peoples and 
their natural environment.’ 
IBCHTs exhibit hybrid and evolving forms of governance and engage in multi-scale 
political and economic interactions – achievements that are sometimes claimed for co-
governance. The difference here (and indeed, the point) is that in the case of Indigenous 
Biocultural Heritage Territories, it is the Indigenous communities themselves are the drivers of 
this hybridity and interactivity, and the processes and systems entailed are anchored in 
Indigenous philosophies, legal-political orders, and everyday practices. In drawing political 
possibilities from the international legal stage, the communities of the Parque de la Papa are 
hardly unique (cf. Greene 2005); nor does their creativity and tenacity in these endeavours set 
them apart from other Indigenous groups, even in the Peruvian altiplano (cf. Oliart 2008). What 
they are accomplishing is example-setting: proving that Indigenous self-governance is a viable 
(indeed, in this case thriving) alternative to co-management. Certain caveats merit mention, 
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however. In this instance, it is not so much that the state pursued a governance model that the 
communities resisted, but conversely, that the Peruvian government has expressed only 
wavering interest in the governance of the territory at all. The cultural heritage in this case was 
‘mobile’ – agricultural products, in particular the many and unique varieties of potato 
hybridized and cultivated in the Parque – and thus subject to both physical alienation and 
‘capture’ via intellectual property laws, rather than being exploitable strictly in situ. Further, 
the communities ingeniously tapped into the government’s desire to appear progressive vis-à-
vis globally ascendant Indigenous rights instruments, and interest in leveraging the centrality 
of Indigenous heritage to the effective commodification of the resource (Grey 2011). Peru 
being a ‘developing’ country, in this case, ironically may have provided additional leeway for 
Indigenous strategic manoeuverability, with the skyrocketing commercial value of ‘ethnicity’ 




The Laponia World Heritage Site (and in particular its steering body, 
Laponiatjuottjudus), for all of its problems, is a significant achievement in co-management – 
but it is not Indigenous governance. As Maraud and Guyot assert, it is ‘seen as a local success 
more than an Indigenous one’ (2016, 208). At other Indigenous sites in danger of exploitation, 
like Suttesája, it thus becomes necessary to look beyond Laponia for inspiration, in order to 
protect not just the land and its natural features, but the historical meaning and contemporary 
relevance of the values, knowledge, and practices threaded through these places.  
If we were to consider the other case we have presented above, the Parque de la Papa, 
as a potential model for solving the challenge of Suttesája – the fact it remains inadequately 
protected, administered by the state-owned enterprise Metsähallitus and thus vulnerable to 
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commercial and other ventures – what ‘best practices,’ caveats, and guideposts would emerge 
from a comparative analysis? More specifically, how might the Parque shed light on a 
framework for Sámi governance that would simultaneously protect the environment and ‘the 
sacred’ that coalesces in the area, in the true sense of the term ‘biocultural’ (in spite of the 
problems/limitations of the term ‘culture’)? We propose that the development of such a model 
might look something like this:  
 
1. Identifying the local authorities – both community leaders and technical experts – through 
a community-built consensus process, using a matrix of personal merit, expertise on 
traditional knowledge, and experience that informs many practices of Arctic Indigenous 
governance (Fondahl & Irlbacher-Fox 2009). Specifically, Sámi families who have 
extensively used the area, for whatever purposes, would play an important role in this 
process. 
2. With the guidance of identified authorities, establishing a community council and a 
procedure for, and schedule of, community assembly meetings. 
3. Identifying the key Sámi principles that need to inform the process of building, and later 
guiding, the established governing and stewardship structure/mechanism. These could 
include, inter alia, community assemblies for discussion and knowledge-sharing; standing 
committees to explore, document, and ‘workshop’ emergent problems and opportunities; 
and inter-, intra-, and extra-community networks and linkages, allowing all interested 
community members and groups to work together and with outside actors and 
organizations, at multiple levels (from the local to the regional to the global).  
4. Ensuring the collaborative design of educational materials, research, and culturally-
grounded mechanisms to document and, where appropriate, disseminate traditional 
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knowledge; and to negotiate and enter into agreements with external actors, according to 
Sami legal and ethical principles. 
5. Asserting and maintaining Sámi as the official language of governance in Suttesája. 
6. Consulting Sámi who have been involved in establishing and running Laponiatjuottjudus. 
Their advice and input would be particularly valuable in considering how to avoid the 




With its ideological roots in the neoliberal turn, and its practical roots in the settler 
colonial project, co-management has demonstrated particular efficacy in channelling 
Indigenous activism and pulling an ‘end run’ around the question of Indigenous rights, 
including (or especially) the rights to land and self-determination. Key to these 
accomplishments is the culturalization of Indigenous peoples and nations: the rhetorical and 
practical reduction of polities to cultures. Another practice is creating a false equivalence 
between ‘Indigenous’ and ‘minority,’ erasing Indigeneity itself – and, accordingly, myriad pre-
existing political-legal orders and their territorial claims. The unprecedented, rapid, global 
diffusion of co-management as a policy prescription occurred alongside the rise of the global 
Indigenous rights movement. Unfortunately – and ironically – the latter inadvertently fuelled 
the former, as co-management performed a controlled inclusion of Indigeneity: for lack of a 
better term ‘assimilating’ the Indigenous knowledges, perspectives, and approaches that would 
otherwise have opposed it. This is not (co-)managing Indigenous cultural heritage, then, but 
managing Indigenous sovereignty.  
Both the Sámi sites we have discussed are paradigmatic targets of co-management 
agreements: relatively peripheral, bureaucratically remote areas containing a higher 
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concentration of (a) Indigenous Peoples who maintain traditional land-based practices, but 
whose right to the land is unrecognized, and (b) in-demand, scarce or threatened resources of 
interest to non-Indigenous parties. Laponia further illustrates one of the major proximate causes 
of Indigenous-state co-management agreements: the Swedish government agreed to Sámi 
demands only after attempting to simply outlast them in a political struggle that, if lost, would 
have cost the country an economically and socioculturally valuable good: the World Heritage 
Site nomination.   
Perhaps the most important practical fallout of the rapid proliferation of co-
management agreements has been their eclipsing of the possibility, and further the existence of 
alternative models. These models, although not (yet) recognized in any convention or treaty, 
nevertheless express the deepest principles of those compacts, while managing a feat that has 
thus far proven beyond the abilities of states and their organizations: integrating international 
legal instruments and the UNDRIP in a way that preserves not only the letter, but the spirit of 
each. We have presented one such model: the Parque de la Papa in Andean Peru. 
Analyses like ours, advocating Indigenous political resurgence, typically face criticism 
that either tacitly or explicitly appeals to the capacity shortfalls of the ‘vanishing Indian:’ 
Indigenous governance cannot be put in place because it has been sufficiently eroded as to be 
unworkable in practice today (or in simpler terms: you cannot have Indigenous governance 
because you do not already have Indigenous governance). This circular argument is easily 
proven incorrect by the existing (and growing) number of Indigenous people that are asserting 
Indigenous law in, and Indigenous governance over, the preservation and promotion of their 
cultural heritage. Neither is ours an isolationist nor an essentialist argument, although critiques 
of Indigenous peoples’ normative approaches to (and advocacy around) policymaking often 
face such accusations. Indigenous communities and nations exhibit hybrid and evolving forms 
of governance and engage in multi-scale political and economic interactions – achievements 
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that are sometimes claimed for co-governance. The difference here (indeed, the point) is that 
in the former, it is the Indigenous communities themselves are the drivers of this hybridity and 
interactivity, and the processes and systems entailed are anchored in Indigenous philosophies, 
legal-political orders, and everyday practices. Since Indigenous conceptualizations of culture 
are holistic, active, territorialized, and grounded in a specific set of values and philosophical 
system (including an ontology, epistemology, and axiology), they must be protected through 




1. We would respectfully point out, however, the apparent trend toward government 
abandonment of the term ‘co-management’ specifically because of the implication that it 
means the state is ‘sharing power’ (Clark and Joe-Strack 2017). Further, at least one 
official, in a region with a relatively lauded history of co-management, has implied that 
such arrangements are ‘undemocratic’ (Clark and Joe-Strack 2017). 
2. http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ 
3. Since they both have roots in critiques of centralised, top-down management, 
neoliberalism was able to borrow the emancipatory language of sustainable development 
and marry it with market-based efficiency and self-interest arguments to craft an 
ostensibly ‘win-win’ scenario in heritage co-management. 
4. The co-management approach has been discussed under a number of other monikers: 




5. The very first edited volume on co-management generally was published in 1989; by the 
mid-2000s a significant portion of the literature was devoted to Indigenous-state 
arrangements (Plummer and Armitage 2007; Pinkerton 1989). 
6. In Taiwan, for example, federal legislation mandating such arrangements has been 
circumvented at the regional level by administrators who lack motivation to engage with 
tribal groups, and agencies that eschew losing control over conserved areas and 
conservation generally (Lu, Chueh and Kao 2012). 
7. In determining whether a site is already managed, states work from historical, almost 
always non-Indigenous sources, and the inquiry overall is guided by longstanding biases 
about the status of ‘traditional livelihoods’ as a significant environmental threat (Berkes 
2008; Ross 2011). 
8. The Inuvialuit Self-Government Agreement-in-Principle ‘provides the Inuvialuit with 
jurisdiction and a broad scope to manage their cultural heritage in ways that they see as 
appropriate for their particular needs’ (Ford 2017, 206); the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement provides ‘principles for the various aspects of Inuit cultural heritage in 
Nunavut’ including managing the archaeology of the territory (207); and the Labrador 
Inuit Land Claims Agreement provides the Nunatsiavut government ‘jurisdiction and 
control over the creation of laws to protect archaeological and cultural material’ (211). 
9. See https://www.samediggi.no/Balvalusat2/Biras-areala-ja-kultursuodjaleapmi#section-
Kulturmuittut 
10. These include not only the money from cultural heritage tourism, but also often 
significant employment opportunities, in establishing, restoring, and running the site 
(Ween 2012). 
11. ‘Transhumance is a term referring to the seasonal movement of people with their 
livestock, elsewhere called ‘pastoralism’ or ‘nomadism.’ 
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12. Of the 1,073 currently listed World Heritage Sites, 35 (3%) are classified as ‘mixed.’ 
13. Personal communication, 14 June 2011. 
14. Note, though that this recommendation still characterized Sámi as local, rather than 
Indigenous; further, this accords with the Swedish government’s construction of Sámi 
‘special’ rights as flowing from minority, versus Indigenous status. 
15. Personal communication, 14 June 2011. 
16. Personal communication, 14 June 2011. 
17. Personal communication, 14 June 2011. 
18. Personal communication, 14 June 2011. 
19. More specifically, the parties include two municipalities, nine Sámi reindeer-herding 
communities (through Mijá Ednam, which in Sámi means ‘our land’), the Norrbotten 
County Administrative Board and the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. 
20. Personal communication, 6 November 2017. 
21. In 2017, the lease was not granted because segment of the affected area in the application 
was within the protected Natura 2000 area. In 2018, the applicants had revised the 
affected area but this time, the lease was declined on the grounds of ‘very strong local 
Sámi opposition’ (Paltto 2018). 
22. These include, inter alia, the Convention on Biodiversity, the ILO Convention 169, and 
the UNDRIP. 
23. This CIP protocol is noteworthy for setting several precedents in the assertion of 
Indigenous law as/through Indigenous governance. Under the Parque-CIP Biocultural 
Protocol, any access to the genetic resources of the communities must be carried out 
according to the local vision of prior informed consent, and said access does not allow for 
any type of gene privatization, patenting, or GMO application (since these compromises, 
whether directly or in principle, the communities’ ability to produce food and to fulfill 
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their obligations to the land). Further, CIP came to the negotiating table after being 
approached by the communities about the institute’s past violations of Quechua law in the 
Urubamba Valley – namely, collecting landraces and crop wild relatives from the 
territories of the six communities without their consent and without sharing the fruits of 
subsequent research. The protocol thus holds the International Potato Centre accountable 
to the communities’ own law, while CIP’s efforts represent (albeit voluntary) restorative 
justice for what was, under any other system, a perfectly legal act. In the case at hand, 
then, the biocultural protocol helps to ensure that Quechua farmers may continue to freely 
grow food and protect agrobiodiversity, while establishing that this has been their right 
and responsibility for generations. They are thus an important means by which to protect 
the Parque communities in the present and ensure the continuity of their knowledge-
practice in the future. The researching and negotiation of the instrument also enlivened 
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